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1 Introduction
There is increasing acceptance amongst economists that people may care about their
relative position as well as the absolute level of their consumption. For example, a
survey of empirical research on happiness goes as far as to conclude that in determining
happiness “It is not the absolute level of income that matters most but rather oneŠs
position relative to other individuals” (Frey and Stutzer, 2002, p411). If this is the
case, it seems a natural conclusion that greater inequality would worsen the degree of
social competition (Frank (1999)) and, therefore, give a new justification for policies to
reduce inequality. In earlier work (Hopkins and Kornienko (2004a)), we were able to
elaborate the model of relative concerns of Frank (1985) so that we could characterise
how equilibrium behaviour and equilibrium utility changed in response to changes in
the distribution of income. We found that, surprisingly, greater equality could lead to
an increase in conspicuous consumption and a reduction in welfare for those with middle
and low incomes. Thus, even in the presence of relative concerns, greater equality is
not necessarily welfare-enhancing. A limitation of this analysis, however, was that it
was based on comparisons at a fixed level of income. That is, in eﬀect we investigated
the behaviour of agents whose income did not change as the income of those around
them did.
In this paper, we analyse the eﬀects of a general redistribution of income in an
economy where agents’ utility depends both on consumption and on status, defined
as rank in the distribution of consumption of one positional good. In particular, we
investigate linear income tax schemes, where the money raised is redistributed equally
across the population. This reduces inequality while maintaining the relative position of
each individual. We find that the equilibrium level of expenditure on the positional good
rises for most agents with the possible exception of some with above average income.
Equilibrium utility falls for most of the population, with the possible exception of some
of those with below average income. That is, even the gainers in terms of income may
lose in terms of welfare.
In our current work and our earlier paper, Hopkins and Kornienko (2004a), we use
the same model derived from that of Frank (1985), where individuals must decide how
to divide their income between consumption of a normal good and a positional good.
For example, one might care about the characteristics of one’s car, but also about how
it compares to those of own’s neighbours. The choice of the positional good is therefore
strategic, in that consumption choices of my neighbours aﬀect my payoﬀs, as does my
choice aﬀects theirs. The symmetric Nash equilibrium of the resulting game will be
Pareto ineﬃcient in that all will spend more on the positional good than in the absence
of status concerns, but resulting in no net change in relative position. That is, everyone
increases conspicuous consumption in order to improve status, but any gain in status
is cancelled out by the similarly increased expenditure of others. A salient question in
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this context is how the distribution of income eﬀects the degree of social competition
and, hence, the amount of excess consumption.
In such a model, however, changes in the income distribution can aﬀect agents
through three channels: one’s own income, one’s relative position or rank in the distri-
bution, and the shape of the distribution all matter. Of necessity, any analysis must
hold at least of one of these constant. In our previous work, we considered changes
in the distribution of income that left some people’s incomes unchanged. For example,
imagine a change in taxes on earned income that does not aﬀect those who do not work.
We then analysed how someone with unchanged income would respond to the change in
the distribution of income. We found that a reduction of inequality of this type would
lead to a fall in utility for those with low income.
It has been argued to us, however, that this “equality hurts the poor” result may be
misleading. Often, when one thinks of a reduction in inequality, one thinks, for example,
of an increase in income of the poor, rather than a change that keeps the incomes of
some poor people constant. In response to this argument, we here consider changes
in the distribution of income that aﬀect every individual. Those with below average
income have their income raised, and those with above average income have their net
income decreased. The linear schemes we consider, however, do have the advantage is
that they keep constant the relative position of all individuals. That is, in contrast to
our earlier work, we keep relative position constant, not income.
We find as we did before that an increase in equality increases the degree of social
competition. The closer individuals are together, the easier it is to overtake others in
status, thus giving a greater incentive to indulge in conspicuous consumption. This
means that the overall eﬀect for the poor is ambiguous: they have greater income, but
more of it may be spent on wasteful consumption. We can find examples where the poor
are worse oﬀ in a more equal society, even with higher income, and other examples where
they benefit. However, the eﬀect on those richer than average is definitely negative.
This is in contrast to the eﬀect of a reduction in inequality in Hopkins and Kornienko
(2004a), where the eﬀect on the rich was ambiguous, and on the poor was definitely
negative.
We hope these contrasting results may help to explain why it has been diﬃcult to
establish empirically whether greater equality does in fact lead to greater happiness.
Clark (2003), using British panel data, finds a positive relationship between inequality
and self-reported happiness while Senik (2004) finds that inequality has no statistical
influence on life satisfaction in post-reform Russia. In contrast, Alesina et al. (2004)
find a negative relationship between inequality and happiness for both Europe and the
US. Our results suggest that, even in the presence of relative concerns, whether greater
equality does increase utility or happiness may depend quite sensitively on the measure
of equality considered.
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2 The Model
Following Frank (1985), we consider a simple model where individuals care about their
social status as determined by their (conspicuous) consumption of a visible (positional)
good, as well as absolute level of (conspicuous) consumption of this visible (positional)
good x and absolute level of (non-conspicuous) consumption of another (non-positional)
good y, the consumption of which is not directly observable by other agents. We assume
an economy consisting of a continuum of agents, identical except in terms of income.
Each agent is endowed with a level of income z which is private information and is
an independent draw from a common distribution. This is described by a distribution
function G(z) which is twice continuously diﬀerentiable with a strictly positive density
on some interval [z, z¯] with z ≥ 0.
Agents’ choices of conspicuous consumption are aggregated in a distribution of con-
spicuous consumption F (·), with F (x) being the mass of individuals with consumption
less than or equal to x. Following Frank (1985) and Robson (1992), an agent’s status
will be determined by her position in the distribution of conspicuous consumption, with
higher consumption meaning higher status. Following Hopkins and Kornienko (2004a),
we define status as follows:
S(x, F (·)) = δF (x) + (1− δ)F−(x) + S0 (1)
where x is individual’s consumption, δ ∈ [0, 1), F (x) is the mass of individuals with
consumption less or equal to x, and F−(x) = limx0→x− F (x0) is the mass of individuals
with consumption strictly less than x. The current formulation is a way of dealing with
ties. For example, if all agents chose the same level of consumption in one sense they
would all be “equal first”, but it is unlikely that they would gain the same level of
satisfaction as someone who was uniquely first. To reflect this, the current assumption
would award them status equal to δ which is strictly less than one.1 In contrast, if the
distribution of consumption F (x) is continuous, there are no ties, the above measure of
status is identical to rank in consumption, or S(x, F (·)) = F (x). The parameter S0 ≥ 0
is a constant representing a guaranteed minimum level of status, reflecting the intensity
of social pressures. We discuss its role below.
Individuals have identical Cobb-Douglas-style preferences over absolute consump-
tions and status as follows:
U = xαyβS(x, F (·))γ
They make a simultaneous allocation of their incomes z between conspicuous consump-
tion x and non-conspicuous consumption y, so that each agent faces the following prob-
lem,
max
x,y
xαyβS(x, F (·))γ subject to x+ y ≤ z, x ≥ 0, y ≥ 0. (2)
1This also gives agents an incentive to break any ties, so, as we will see, there will be no ties in
equilibrium. See Hopkins and Kornienko (2004a) for a full rationale of this specification.
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The unit price of the two goods are taken to be equal, and are normalised to one.
Notice that if γ = 0, there is no concern with status, and the optimal choices are
simply:
x∗(zi) =
α
α+ β
zi, y
∗(zi) =
β
α+ β
zi (3)
But if individuals are in competition for status, that implies that their choice of con-
sumption of diﬀerent types of goods is strategic. Note that the distribution of conspic-
uous consumption F (·) is endogenously determined, so is the social status S(x, F (·)).
Thus, a rational individual makes a consumption choice in anticipation of consumption
choices of all other individuals, i.e. is engaged into a game of status.
It is possible to solve the resulting game but the solution will, however, depend on
the distribution of income in society. This approach is developed in more generality
and detail in Hopkins and Kornienko (2004a), so here we will only briefly sketch the
main features of the game. Here, a strategy for an agent is a choice of a mapping from
income z to conspicuous consumption x. This game has a formal resemblance to a first-
price auction, as increasing one’s conspicuous consumption leads to a trade-oﬀ between
the increase in status and the decrease in non-conspicuous consumption component of
utility, just as a bidder in an auction trades oﬀ an increase in probability of winning for
lower realized profits in the event of winning.
In this context, a symmetric equilibrium will be a Nash equilibrium in which all
agents use the same strategy, that is, the same mapping x(z) from income to conspicuous
consumption. Suppose all agents adopt the same increasing, diﬀerentiable strategy
xi = x(zi) and consider whether any individual agent has an incentive to deviate.
Suppose that instead of following the strategy followed by the others, an agent with
wealth zi chooses xi = x(zˆ), that is, she consumes as though she had wealth zˆ. Note
first that F (xi) = G(x−1(xi)) = G(zˆ), resulting in Si = S0 +G(zˆ), and second that her
utility would be equal to
Ui = x(zˆ)
α(z − x(zˆ))β(S0 +G(zˆ))γ
We diﬀerentiate with respect to zˆ. Then, given that in a symmetric equilibrium, the
agent uses the equilibrium strategy and so zˆ = zi, this gives the first order condition,
αx0(zi)
x(zi)
− βx
0(zi)
zi − x(zi)
+
γg(zi)
S0 +G(zi)
= 0. (4)
This first order condition therefore defines a diﬀerential equation,
x0(zi) =
Ã
γ
α+ β
x(zi)(zi − x(zi))
x(zi)− x∗(zi)
!Ã
g(zi)
S0 +G(zi)
!
. (5)
An important point to recognise is that this diﬀerential equation and the equilibrium
strategy, which is its solution, both depend on the distribution of income G.
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We also need to specify the boundary conditions for the diﬀerential equation. As
Hopkins and Kornienko (2004a) show, the boundary condition depends on the “inten-
sity” of concern with status, and in particular, the level of S0. When social norms are
such that being lowest in society results in complete social exclusion, S0 = 0, then low
ranked individuals are desperate to avoid that fate and spend heavily on visible con-
sumption.2 Specifically, if S0 = 0, then x(z) ≤ z with limz→z+ x(z) = z, or those close
to the bottom must spend close to all their income on visible consumption. However,
if S0 > 0, then low ranked individuals are no longer desperate, and the choice of the
individual with the lowest income z is as though she has no concern for status at all.
She knows she will come last, so why try? That is, her choice is given by the equations
(3). We have,
x(z) =
(
z if S0 = 0
α
α+β
z = x∗(z) if S0 > 0
(6)
y(z) =
(
0 if S0 = 0
β
α+β
z = y∗(z) if S0 > 0
(7)
As we show later, these boundary conditions play an important role in our analysis.
It is also important to stress that, as Frank (1985) was the first to point out, Nash
equilibrium consumption of the positional good is higher than in the absence of status
concerns. Formally, Hopkins and Kornienko (2004a, Proposition 1) show the following.
Proposition 1 The diﬀerential equation (5) with boundary conditions (6) has a unique
solution which is an essentially unique symmetric Nash equilibrium of the game of sta-
tus. Equilibrium conspicuous consumption x(zi) is greater than in the absence of status
concerns, x(zi) > x∗(zi) on (z, z¯].
The equilibrium is only “essentially” unique as when S0 = 0, as there is other
possible equilibrium behaviour for the agent with the lowest income. Specifically, given
the necessary condition for equilibrium limz→z+ x(z) = z, the agent with income z will
always have rank zero and always have zero utility and so is indiﬀerent between any
choice of x on the range [0, z]. The specific boundary conditions (6) and (7) are not
crucial to our analysis but are used for convenience.
3 Introducing Redistribution
As we saw in the previous section, individuals’ consumption choices depend on the
distribution of income. Thus, if the distribution changes, consumption choices will
2Note that S0 = 0 represents social rather than material exclusion. The lowest ranked individual
could still have an income z that is significantly greater than zero.
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change as well. Thus, the question arises: what will happen to consumption choices if
the income distribution becomes more equal - say, as a result of redistributive taxation?
In this section, we introduce a novel treatment of linear income taxes. This treatment,
together with an assumption of Cobb-Douglas-style preferences, will allow us to do a
comparative static analysis of consumption choices of an individual at the same rank
for any income distribution. This is in contrast to Hopkins and Kornienko (2004a),
who performed comparative static analysis for more general type of preferences but
for specific pairs of income distributions that satisfy strong refinements of stochastic
dominance. Also, the comparative static analysis was done for individuals at fixed
income level rather than at the same rank.
We will consider a pure redistributive taxation scheme of the following form: indi-
viduals with above-average income pay a tax of τ(z−µ), while those with below-average
income receive a subsidy of τ(µ− z), where τ ∈ [0, 1) is the tax rate and µ is the aver-
age income in the society. The redistribution scheme is equivalent to the one in which
everyone is taxed at a flat rate τ , and the tax revenue is redistributed back equally. Let
z˜i represent the post-tax income of someone with initial income zi, then
z˜i = (1− τ)zi + τµ⇒ zi =
z˜i
1− τ −
τµ
1− τ (8)
As the result, the initial before-tax distribution G(z) is a mean-reserving spread of the
after-tax distribution G˜(z˜) (see Figure 1). In other words, the above pure redistributive
taxation scheme is inequality-reducing.
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
z
0.5
1
1.5
2
gHzL
Densities g(z) and g˜(z˜)
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
z
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
GHzL
Distributions G(z) and G˜(z˜)
Figure 1: Before-tax income distribution G (solid curves) is a mean-preserving spread
of after-tax income distribution G˜ (dashed curves), and the two distributions cross at
the mean income µ.
Being a lump-sum tax, it might be thought that the policy only aﬀects the incentives
to consume diﬀerent types of goods insofar as it changes the current income of the
individual. However, it also changes the return to conspicuous consumption through
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the change in returns to status as it is determined by the income distribution. To see
that, observe that the after-tax distribution of income G˜(z˜) is the same type3 as the
before-tax distribution G(z), so that for a fixed individual i with income zi4 we have
G˜(z˜i) = G(zi) = G
µ
z˜i
1− τ −
τµ
1− τ
¶
g˜(z˜i) =
1
1− τ g(zi) =
1
1− τ g
µ
z˜i
1− τ −
τµ
1− τ
¶
That is, while the linear redistributive tax scheme is rank-preserving (that is, individual
i has the same rank in the after-tax income hierarchy as in the before-tax income
hierarchy), the density of individuals is, however, increased at every income level, which,
in turn, will increase the returns to conspicuous consumption.
In what follows, we explore how redistributive taxes change the allocation between
conspicuous and non-conspicuous consumption in the presence of status concerns. To do
so, let us first denote the after-tax optimal choice functions as x˜(·) and y˜(·), respectively.
We fix an individual i with before-tax income zi and post-tax income z˜i, and compare
her optimal choices of before and after tax. Let us employ the following notation:
xˆ(zi) = x˜((1− τ)zi + τµ) = x˜(z˜i)
yˆ(zi) = y˜((1− τ)zi + τµ) = y˜(z˜i)
where x˜(z˜i) and y˜(z˜i) are optimal choices of an individual i after the tax is imposed.
Importantly, what we will analyze will be xˆ(zi) and yˆ(zi) which denote after-tax con-
sumption decisions for individual i with before-tax income zi.
We also are interested in the comparison of the before and after-tax equilibrium
welfare for each individual. For an individual i with with before-tax income zi, let
U(zi) = x(zi)
αy(zi)
β(S0 + G(zi))
γ be the utility gained in the symmetric equilibrium
before the tax is imposed, and let U˜(z˜i) = x(z˜i)αy(z˜i)β(S0+G(z˜i))γ be the equilibrium
utility after the tax is imposed. Using similar notation, we write:
U˜(z˜i) = U˜((1− τ)zi + τµ) = Uˆ(zi)
4 Comparative Static Analysis
We now turn to the comparative static analysis.5 In this section, we consider an individ-
ual i with pre-tax income zi. After the linear distributive tax scheme is implemented,
3Distribution functions F and G with density functions f and g, respectively, are of the same type
if there exist constants a > 0 and b, such that G(x) = F (ax+ b), g(x) = af(ax+ b) for all x (see, for
example, Feller (1968).
4We can think of an index i as individual’s rank in the before-tax income hierarchy, i.e. i = G(zi).
5The results in this section are a generalization of those in Hopkins and Kornienko (2004b).
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her post-tax income is z˜i = (1 − τ)zi + τµ. As it was noted in the previous section,
the linear tax scheme is rank-preserving, so that an individual’s rank in pre-tax in-
come hierarchy coincides with post-tax income hierarchy. In turn, this implies that, in
the equilibrium, her rank in the distribution of conspicuous consumption will also be
unchanged by the redistributive taxation.
Yet, her equilibrium choice of consumption will change because of two reasons. First
this happens for a conventional reason - because her income changed. Recall that as
the portion of the utility that depends on the absolute levels of consumption imply that
both positional and non-positional goods are normal. Thus, in the absence of status
concerns we would expect that, after the tax is imposed, those with below-average
income will consume more of both positional and non-positional goods as their incomes
have increased, while those with above average income will consume less of both goods
as their incomes have decreased, and we will also expect that the individual with mean
income will not change her consumption choices as her income stayed the same.
However, there is a second eﬀect namely that, in the equilibrium, the return to status
changes as the income distribution changes. As the previous section shown, the post-
tax income distribution is diﬀerent from the pre-tax income distribution. Moreover,
this change is such that the redistributive tax increases the density of individuals at
each income level. This, in turn, increases social pressures, and thus provides an upward
pressure to consume in a conspicuous way at the expense of non-positional consumption.
As we will show below, the relative strength of the two eﬀects is important. We first
start with spending on positional goods.
Proposition 2 Suppose x(zi) and xˆ(zi) are the equilibrium choices of conspicuous con-
sumption before and after tax, respectively, for an individual i with before-tax income
zi. Then, for any S0 ≥ 0, xˆ(zi) crosses x(zi) at most once at some zx×. Moreover,
xˆ(zi) > x(zi) for all zi ∈ (z, µ], with a possible crossing on (µ, z¯].
The above statement oﬀers a clear-cut result: the equilibrium conspicuous con-
sumption of those with below-average income (with a possible exception for the poorest
individual) is always higher after tax relatively to that before tax. This is hardly sur-
prising given that these people have higher income after the redistributive tax scheme
is imposed. What is surprising that the individual with average income, whose income
is unchanged by the redistributive tax scheme, nevertheless has higher conspicuous con-
sumption after tax is imposed. This is because after the tax is imposed, most of the
individuals feel increased social pressure by those with lower incomes, and, thus, in
order to “keep up”, they have to spend more on positional goods. For the same reason,
people with incomes slightly higher than the average income, will generally also spend
more on positional goods after the tax is imposed, even though they incomes are lower
now (see Figure 2). In this and in following figures, average income is at 0.5.
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Figure 2: Equilibrium choices of conspicuous consumption before tax (solid curves) and
after tax (dashed curves) as a function of pre-tax income.
The increased incentives to consume positional goods for those at the lower end of
the distribution arise because of greater return to status arising as the consequence of
redistribution. This, in turn, may reduce incentives to consume non-positional goods
for some individuals (see Figure 3), as the next statement shows.6
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Figure 3: Equilibrium choices of non-positional consumption before tax (solid curves)
and after tax (dashed curves) as a function of pre-tax income.
Proposition 3 Suppose y(zi) and yˆ(zi) are the equilibrium choices of non-positional
consumption before and after tax, respectively, for an individual i with before-tax income
zi. From the boundary condition (7), we have yˆ(z) ≥ y(z). Furthermore,
6It is important to mention that, while the equilibrium conspicuous consumption schedules are
increasing with income, the equilibrium non-conspicuous consumption schedules may be non-monotone.
In particular, when social competition is not very “harsh” (i.e. S0 > 0), non-conspicuous consumption
schedules of some relatively poor individuals may decrease with income.
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(i) for S0 > 0, yˆ(zi) crosses y(zi) exactly once and from above at some point z
y
×, where
z < zy× < µ;
(ii) for S0 = 0, either yˆ(zi) crosses y(zi) exactly once and from above at some point z
y
×,
where z < zy× < µ or yˆ(zi) < y(zi) for all zi on (z, z¯].
The above statement says that, regardless of the importance of status, the “mid-
dle” and “upper” classes (those with near-average and above average incomes) spend
less of their income on non-positional goods after the linear tax schedule is imposed.
While for those with above-average incomes this is hardly a surprise, as their after-tax
income is lower than their before-tax income, the consumption behavior of those with
average income is startling as their income stays unchanged. But this is because linear
taxes result in a more equal after-tax income distribution, with a bigger mass of people
bunching around the mean income, which in turn result in a more fierce social compe-
tition. The same goes for those few individuals with incomes immediately below the
mean income who also spend less on non-positional goods even those they have higher
after-tax income than before taxes were imposed. We will now turn to the comparative
statics analysis of equilibrium utility before and after taxes.
Proposition 4 Suppose U(zi) and Uˆ(zi) are the equilibrium utilities before and after
tax, respectively, for an individual i with before-tax income zi. First, if S0 = 0, then
U(z) = Uˆ(z) = 0, but if S0 > 0, then U(z) < Uˆ(z). Second, for any S0 ≥ 0, then
U(µ) > Uˆ(µ). Furthermore, Uˆ(zi) may cross U(zi) at most once - from above at some
z ≤ zy× ≤ zU× < µ.
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Figure 4: Equilibrium utility before tax (solid curves) and after tax (dashed curves) as
a function of pre-tax income.
The above proposition has three important points. First, it is clear that the in-
dividual with mean income is worse oﬀ with redistribution. Second, it clarifies what
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happens to the beneficiaries of the greater equality, i.e. those at the bottom of the in-
come distribution. They indeed may be better oﬀ with redistribution. Once the linear
tax is imposed, their after-tax income (actually, their after-subsidy income) is higher.
However, how much of this increased income is spent on positional goods is determined
by the intensity of social competition (characterized by S0). If this intensity is very
high (i.e. S0 = 0), the very poor invest nothing out of their increased after-tax in-
come, and spend it all on conspicuous consumption. Yet, if the social competition is
not so cut-throat (S0 > 0), the very poor spend a fixed proportion of their income
on non-positional goods, so that their after-tax consumption of non-positional goods
is higher simply because the after-tax income is higher. Eventually, however, the in-
creased income is not enough to deal with the increased social pressure, so that, starting
at some income level, increase their conspicuous consumption at the expense of their
non-positional one. As the social pressure builds up further as we move along the in-
come line closer to the mean income, the increase in conspicuous consumption results
in a decrease in equilibrium utility (see Figure 4).
Third, it oﬀers insights to what happens to the “upper” classes. As they see their in-
comes decreased by the redistribution, they unambiguously spend less on non-positional
goods. Yet, as a consequence of redistribution, the social pressures ease up at the top of
the distribution, some people may spend less on conspicuous consumption. Nonetheless,
overall the rich are worse oﬀ after tax.
5 Conclusion
It is often assumed that social preferences, where individual agents care about what
others have, imply a distaste for inequality. Here, when individuals care about their
social position as indicated by their rank in visible or conspicuous consumption, we find
that greater equality can make people worse oﬀ. In fact, even those who receive net
subsidies in the redistribution schemes that we consider can end up with lower utility.
The reason being that greater equality increases the incentives to diﬀerentiate oneself,
raising the equilibrium level of conspicuous consumption.
That is, our results are in broad concordance with those in our earlier work (Hopkins
and Kornienko (2004a)) which used a diﬀerent type of change in equality to generate
its comparative statics results. It is true that the distribution of gains and losses is
diﬀerent here. In particular, in the current analysis, the very poorest will gain from
redistribution except in the extreme situation where the lowest ranked individuals are
completely socially excluded. Under the type of changes considered in Hopkins and
Kornienko (2004a), the poor were always worse oﬀ. However, in both cases, we have
the unexpected result that the middle classes are hurt by greater equality.
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Appendix: Proofs
Lemma 1 Consider three pairs of positive functions: ψA(t) and ψB(t); φA(t) and
φB(t); ξA(t) and ξB(t), all continuous in t on some interval (t, t¯). Suppose that these
function stand in the following relationship:
ψA(t)
ψB(t)
φA(t)
φB(t)
ξA(t)
ξB(t)
= 1 (9)
and suppose that ξA(t) < ξB(t) for all t ∈ (t, t¯). Then,
(i) a pair of functions ψA(t) and ψB(t) cross at most once;
(ii) a pair of functions φA(t) and φB(t) cross at most once;
(iii) if these crossings do occur, then ψA(t) crosses ψB(t) from below at some point t1 ∈
(t, t¯) and φA(t) crosses φB(t) from above at some point t2 ∈ (t, t¯) with t < t1 < t2 < t¯.
Proof of Lemma 1: Since ξA(t) < ξB(t) on (t, t¯), then
ψA(t)
ψB(t)
φA(t)
φB(t)
> 1
on this interval. Suppose that ψA(t) crosses ψB(t) on this interval at some point t1.
Then it must be that φA(t1) > φB(t1). Furthermore, suppose that φA(t) crosses φB(t)
on this interval at some point t2. Then it must be that ψA(t2) > ψB(t2). Thus, each
pair of functions ψA(t) and ψB(t); φA(t) and φB(t); can cross only once on this interval.
Suppose that these crossings occur, and, without loss of generality, suppose that ψA(t)
crosses ψB(t) from below at t1. Then it must be that φA(t) crosses φB(t) from above at
t2. Moreover, it is clear that t1 < t2.
Proof of Proposition 2: Let us start by looking more closely into the first-order
condition for the after-tax economy:
∂x˜(z˜i)
∂z˜i
=
Ã
γ
α+ β
x˜(z˜i)(z˜i − x˜(z˜i))
x˜(z˜i)− x∗(z˜i)
!Ã
g˜(z˜i)
S0 + G˜(z˜i)
!
=
=
Ã
γ
α+ β
x˜(z˜i)(z˜i − x˜(z˜i))
x˜(z˜i)− x∗(z˜i)
!Ã
1
1− τ
g(zi)
S0 +G(zi)
!
Notice also that
∂xˆ(zi)
∂zi
=
∂x˜(z˜i)
∂z˜i
∂z˜i
∂zi
= (1− τ)∂x˜(z˜i)
∂z˜i
so that the marginal change in equilibrium after-tax conspicuous consumption arising
from a change in a before-tax income is:
xˆ0 =
∂xˆ(zi)
∂zi
=
Ã
γ
α+ β
x˜(z˜i)(z˜i − x˜(z˜i))
x˜(z˜i)− x∗(z˜i)
!Ã
g(zi)
S0 +G(zi)
!
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Thus, the ratio of the marginal changes in equilibrium after-tax and before-tax conspic-
uous consumption arising from a change in a pre-tax income is:
xˆ0
x0
=
x˜(z˜i)
x(zi)
z˜i − x˜(z˜i)
zi − x(zi)
x(zi)− x∗(zi)
x˜(z˜i)− x∗(z˜i)
(10)
Now, if xˆ(zi) and x(zi) do cross at all, it must be that at the points of crossing
(zx×, x×) we have:
xˆ0
x0
=
z˜x× − x×
zx× − x×
x× − x∗(zx×)
x× − x∗(z˜x×)
which is greater than 1 if zx× < µ and less than 1 if z
x
× > µ. Thus, xˆ(zi) crosses x(zi)
at most twice - from below for zi ∈ (z, µ) and from above for zi ∈ (µ, z¯). According to
the boundary condition (6), for all S0 ≥ 0, x˜(z) > x(z). Thus, for all S0 ≥ 0 only one
crossing is possible and to the right of µ.
Proof of Proposition 3: We first show that, for any S0 ≥ 0, yˆ(zi) < y(zi) for all
zi ∈ [µ, z¯], with possible crossings on (z, µ). Notice that
xˆ0
x0
=
(1− τ)− yˆ0
1− y0 =
yˆ(zi)
y(zi)
z˜i − yˆ(zi)
zi − y(zi)
y∗(zi)− y(zi)
y∗(z˜i)− yˆ(zi)
Thus, if y(zi) and yˆ(zi) cross at some point z
y
×, then at the point of crossing z
y
× we have:
(1− τ)− yˆ0
1− y0 =
z˜y× − y×
zy× − y×
y∗(zy×)− y×
y∗(z˜y×)− y×
Let us first suppose that yˆ(zi) crosses y(zi) from below, so that yˆ0 > y0 at this point of
crossing zy×. In this case,
z˜y× − y×
y∗(z˜y×)− y×
y∗(zy×)− y×
zy× − y×
< 1⇔ y
∗(zy×)− y×
zy× − y×
<
y∗(z˜y×)− y×
z˜y× − y×
which is true for z˜y× > z
y
×. Thus, yˆ(zi) can cross y(zi) from below only to the left of
µ. This, in turn, implies that yˆ(zi) and y(zi) cannot cross to the right of µ because, by
Proposition 2, yˆ(µ) = µ− xˆ(µ) < y(µ) = µ− x(µ).
Now, let us turn to the interval (z, µ). Notice that in the equilibrium, S(zi) = S˜(z˜i),
we have that
U(zi)− Uˆ(zi) =
³
x(zi)
αy(zi)
β − xˆ(zi)αyˆ(zi)β
´
(S0 +G(zi))
γ
which can be written as
Uˆ(zi)
U(zi)
x(zi)
α
xˆ(zi)α
y(zi)
β
yˆ(zi)β
= 1 (11)
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By Proposition 2, xˆ(zi) > x(zi) for all zi ∈ (z, µ). By Lemma 1, there can be at most
one crossing of y(zi) and yˆ(zi) to the left of µ.
As it was shown above, yˆ(µ) < y(µ), thus if yˆ(zi) crosses y(zi) to the left of µ,
then it must be from above. By the boundary condition (7), we have that for S0 > 0,
yˆ(z) = y∗(z˜) > y(z) = y∗(z). Thus, for S0 > 0, yˆ(zi) crosses once y(zi) from above to
the left of µ. But for S0 = 0, we have that yˆ(z) = y(z) = 0, so in this case y(zi) and
yˆ(zi) may or may not cross to the left of µ.
Proof of Proposition 4: First, by the boundary conditions (6), when S0, U(z) =
Uˆ(z) = 0. But, when S0 > 0, we have U(z) = U(x∗(z), y∗(z), S0) < U(x∗((1 − τ)z +
τµ), y∗((1−τ)z+τµ), S0) = Uˆ(z). Second, pre-tax and post-tax income are the same at
z, and by Proposition 2, we have x(µ) < xˆ(µ). Since, by Proposition 1, x(µ) > x∗(µ),
and utility is decreasing in x for x > x∗, and so U(µ) > Uˆ(µ).
Let us consider the interval (z, µ]. From the Proposition 2 and the application of
Lemma 1 to the equation (11), we have that there can be at most one crossing of U(zi)
and Uˆ(zi) to the left of µ. By Proposition 3, if yˆ(zi) crosses y(zi) to the left of µ, then
it must be from above, so that if Uˆ(zi) crosses U(zi) to the left of µ, then it must cross
from above as well.
Now let us turn to the interval (µ, z¯], where z < z˜. By Propositions 2 and 3, we
have y(z) > yˆ(z) on the whole interval but x(z) and xˆ(z) may cross once. If at any z in
(µ, z¯] we have both xˆ(z) < x(z) and yˆ(z) < y(z), then Uˆ(z) < U(z), simply because U
is strictly increasing. If we have instead xˆ(z) > x(z) and yˆ(z) < y(z), we then can find
a pair (x0, y0) such that x0 + y0 = z˜ but x∗(z˜) < x0 < x(z) and y0 < y(z). But then,
U(xˆ(z), yˆ(z), S0) < U(x0, y0, S0) < U(x(z), y(z), S0), and the result follows.
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